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The Market for Reverse Mortgages among Older Americans
Abstract
This paper examines the usage of reverse mortgages among mortgage borrowers, as well as rejected
applicants for new mortgage credit who are age 62+. We find that 17-27 percent of actual and rejected
borrowers would have qualified for a HECM reverse mortgage, or nine to 14 times the size of the actual
HECM market. The existence of a large number of seniors with an existing mortgage or taking out a new
mortgage with quite high LTVs (57-65%, depending on the product) suggests that many seniors do, in fact
utilize home equity in order to fund their retirement. Yet they choose products that require monthly
payments lasting decades into retirement and rising as a share of (declining) income as they age. We
consider a number of possible explanations for why seniors in the US do not spend home equity and rely
on loans with high payments, including precautionary savings for health shocks, bequest motives, high
costs of reverse mortgages, and the lack of brand name institutions in the reverse mortgage business.
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Chapter 13

The Market for Reverse Mortgages among
Older Americans
Christopher Mayer and Stephanie Moulton

Reverse mortgages have long been viewed with skepticism by some retirees,
financial planners, and financial institutions. Potential concerns are many,
including high costs, dicey sales practices, and the potential for retirees
to lose their home if things go badly. Interestingly, the same concerns
about reverse mortgages or similar products (‘equity release’ options) seem
to persist in many countries with very different institutions and financial
systems.
Yet the need to access additional retirement assets like home equity
has never been stronger. Academics and researchers lament the lack of
adequate retirement savings and growing debt among older Americans.
Media headlines such as ‘Over 60 with Decades Left on the Mortgage: The
New Retirement Math’ in the Wall Street Journal (Rexrode 2020) are common. Recent studies by the Urban Institute, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, and a number of academics point to the increase in the number
of American householders entering retirement age with a mortgage and
growing average mortgage balances, both in real dollars and as a share of
home equity.1 For example, the proportion of older adults entering retirement with mortgage debt has more than doubled from 20 percent in 1992,
to more than 40 percent in 2016.2 This is occurring even as ever fewer households have a traditional pension and retirees have shrinking 401(k) and
other retirement savings. The economic and financial shrinkage associated
with COVID-19 will only make this problem worse.
Yet the growth in housing debt in the US can also be seen in a different light—as evidence that older householders are effectively consuming
home equity in retirement. Many older householders use traditional mortgage instruments like a Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC), second lien,
or cash-out refinancing to draw down home equity during retirement years.3
Similarly, by leaving existing debt in place for longer, retirees are missing
out on the increase in home equity that used to take place in previous
generations, effectively further reducing savings.
Christopher Mayer and Stephanie Moulton, The Market for Reverse Mortgages among Older Americans.
In: New Models for Managing Longevity Risk. Edited by Olivia S. Mitchell, Oxford University Press.
© Pension Research Council (2022). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192859808.003.0013

The Market for Reverse Mortgages among Older Americans

259

Of course, the problem with using traditional mortgage debt to fund
retirement is that such debt must be paid back just as many householders
are retiring and facing sharp drops in their income. Research by Englehardt and Eriksen (2019) shows that elderly homeowners with a mortgage
face housing expense burdens that mirror those of renters, with a growing share of retirees spending 30 to 50 percent or more of their income
on housing expenses. One in four older adults engages in expensive credit
card behaviors, including paying only the minimum balance, paying over
the limit fees, and using credit cards for cash advance (Lusardi et al. 2020).
Rates of personal bankruptcy are increasing more quickly for older adults
than any other age group in the US (Fisher 2019; Li and White 2020).
It is perhaps not surprising that a higher level of debt—particularly nonhousing consumer debt—is associated with increased stress among older
adults (Haurin et al. 2019). While many workers report an offsetting desire
to retire later, data shows that few elderly people retire as late as they had
planned to at younger ages.4
For most retirees, home equity is the largest single asset they bring into
retirement, even after subtracting mortgage debt. Nearly 80 percent of
adults age 65+ own their homes, and most do still own those free and clear.
Using data from the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances, Moulton and Haurin (2019) estimated that the median homeowner age 62 and older held
more wealth in the form of home equity than in financial assets: $139,000
in home equity, compared to $101,800 in financial assets.
Finding a way to responsibly use home equity would seem to be a priority.
Yet it has also been an elusive goal. One exception is in the United Kingdom,
where equity release options have been growing rapidly in recent years. By
one estimate, about one-in-three mortgages taken out by borrowers over
age 55 is an equity release product. Relative to the population of retirees,
the effective market in the UK is nearly five times the size of that in the US.
Similarly, Canada has seen a sharp rise in the use of reverse mortgages. One
reason for the growth in equity release products in the UK is that mortgage
originators are asked to ensure older borrowers are able to afford mortgage
payments using retirement income, not just current income at the time of
the mortgage. This has pushed mortgage originators to raise the option of
equity release products with older borrowers, and it is likely an important
factor behind their increasing use. Furthermore, UK financial planners do
not face some of the regulatory restrictions in place in the US and often
discuss equity release and other options to use home equity. Also, unlike in
the US, they can also earn a commission from the sale of such products.
In this chapter we explore the US reverse mortgage market and the reasons behind its apparent failure to help fund retirement. We do so while also
exploring how older borrowers use home equity and various types of mortgages to finance their retirement. To do this, we access data from the 2018
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Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), which, for the first time, includes
significantly expanded data such as the type of mortgage available, age of
borrowers, interest rate and costs for each loan, and the lender. Lenders
must also provide information on rejected applicants. We can separately
identify reverse mortgages and compare them to other types of cash-out
borrowing. We also explore other types of mortgages taken out by seniors,
including traditional refinancing and purchase mortgages.
The results show that Americans age 62+ access a wide variety of sources
to borrow against their principal residence. In 2018, only 33,000 originated
reverse mortgages were reported in HMDA, versus 609,000 originated equity extraction loans such as HELOCs, cash-out refinancing, first liens not
for refinance or purchase, and second liens, all of which require traditional
mortgage payments, typically for 15 to 30 years. An additional 688,000 older
Americans originated a mortgage for home purchase or a refinancing, many
of which will require payments beyond age 90. Our analysis focuses on the
Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program, a US governmentinsured reverse mortgage that represents 94 percent of all reported reverse
mortgage originations.
After documenting the extent to which home equity borrowing is important for many retirees, we examine the barriers to accessing home equity
for older adults and find that denial due to excessive debt payments is a
bigger problem for the elderly than for younger potential borrowers. Our
data show that more than 50 percent of older adults denied HELOC or second liens in 2018 were denied because they could not afford the monthly
mortgage payment, compared to 41 percent who were denied for credit reasons. An estimated 70 percent of older adults denied HELOC and
second liens had debt to income (DTI) ratios in excess of 41 percent. By
contrast, for homeowners under the age of 46, only 35 percent were denied
a HELOC or second lien due to affordability (nearly half being denied due
to a poor credit history). At an age where retirement (and thus a loss of
income) is increasingly likely, the large amount of existing debt appears to
be a problem for a large number of older homeowners.
Given that high debt payments are a barrier to affordability for the
elderly, we consider reasons that no-payment loans like a reverse mortgage
represent such as small share of total borrowing. For example, simulations show that between 26 and 36 percent of rejected HELOC and second
lien applicants likely could have accessed a reverse mortgage (n = 54,000
to 74,000). Similarly, between 28 and 40 percent of approved HELOC
and second lien borrowers could have used a reverse mortgage (n = 77,000
to 108,000). Maybe not surprising, given the large amount of borrowing
among many older applicants, the principal reason that reverse mortgages
couldn’t help more HELOC and second lien applicants is that they would
not qualify for a reverse mortgage because they need to borrow too much
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money. Initial loan to value ratios (LTVs) for reverse mortgages are much
lower than for traditional mortgages because of the negative amortization
of the balance when a borrower is not making mortgage payments.
Next, we explore various reasons why reverse mortgages may not be used
more frequently. Our analysis considers four potential reasons that older borrowers already considering home equity borrowing do not choose
a reverse mortgage, including product reputation, higher costs, bequest
motives, and regulatory barriers. We also discuss other motives for not using
home equity among those who don’t explore a new mortgage, including
precautionary savings and the more general puzzle of why many retirees
fail to spend down other assets in retirement (Poterba et al. 2011, for example). We conclude that while high product costs may be a barrier for some
potential borrowers, the poor product reputation and regulatory barriers
also play an important role, particularly in discouraging the participation
of mainstream financial institutions which might be able to bring distribution efficiencies, lower costs, and retirement advice that incorporates home
equity into financial plans.

The Market for Reverse Mortgages and
Equity Release Products
Equity release options in the US and abroad
A reverse mortgage is a loan that allows an older borrower to borrow against
the value of the home without required payments. In most countries including the US, a borrower can take some up-front cash and the balance of the
loan either as a line of credit (LOC or ‘drawdown’) or with fixed monthly payments (tenure payments). A recent survey of selected global equity
release originators by Ernst & Young Global Limited (EY 2020) summarizes
products available across the world. According to the survey, most borrowers take a combination of a fixed up-front payment plus a LOC when the
LOC is available. The LOC allows borrowers to access additional funds as
they desire, similar to a HELOC. In the US, borrowers can make optional
payments and can deduct the portion of the payment that is applied to the
interest in the same way as a traditional (forward) mortgage. Since the loan
balance is expected to grow over time as interest accrues, the origination
LTV ratio of a reverse mortgage is typically much lower than for a traditional
mortgage, and the product is restricted to older borrowers who have a shorter expected time in the property. Common minimum age ranges between
55 (UK and Canada) and 62 (most often in the US) or 65 (Germany). The
amount of proceeds available typically rises for older borrowers.
A reverse mortgage is not the only product that allows borrowers to use
home equity in retirement. It fits inside a larger category of ‘equity release’

262

New Models for Managing Longevity Risk

products. In some countries, particularly Italy, Germany, and France, there
is an active market in home reversions (or viagers), in which the owner ‘sells’
some or all of the future sale proceeds of the home in return for an up-front
lump sum or annuity payment and the right to live in the home as long as
he or she lives.
Equity release products have a number of insurance features that should
be appealing for retirees and allow them to hedge risks that might otherwise
materially impact their financial position in retirement. This is because the
lender/purchaser is giving up-front cash in return for an uncertain future
payoff from the sale of the home. In the vast majority of countries (exceptions include Spain and Germany), the borrower or his or her estate is never
liable for more than the home is worth. Thus, if the borrower lives longer
than expected or home prices fall, the lender/purchaser bears the risk that
the present value of eventual proceeds will be below the amount of money advanced to the borrower at the underwritten cost of capital. Few other
products exist that allow a homeowner to otherwise hedge home price and
longevity risk.

Who can benefit from home equity release?
The most obvious candidates for using home equity in retirement are those
for whom few other options exist. For example, Cocco and Lopes (2019)
have simulations that suggest that reverse mortgage demand should be the
highest among those with low levels of nonhousing wealth relative to home
equity, who have a weak bequest motive, and who have high levels of other
pre-existing debt. The importance of pre-existing debt is consistent with
prior empirical research finding that a large proportion of reverse mortgage
borrowers use reverse mortgages to pay off debt.
Some studies look to calculate the share of borrowers with a relatively
large amount of home equity relative to total assets or income, finding an
appreciable minority of seniors have little income or financial assets and
a comparably large amount of home equity. For example, Goodman et al.
(2017) estimated that as many as 2.5 million to 4.5 million senior households (10% to 17% of the 26 million senior homeowners) could benefit
from a vehicle to tap into home equity, including a reverse mortgage. Mayer
(2017) showed that almost one-quarter of senior households have at least
$50,000 in home equity and less than $50,000 in financial assets in 2012.
Moulton and Haurin (2019) estimated that nearly one in five of older homeowners held less than $10,000 in financial assets, but had at least $40,000 in
home equity. As we show below, originations of reverse mortgages represent
a relatively small share of such potential demand.
An alternative approach to access home equity is through home sale,
however most older adults express strong attachment to their homes.
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In a 2018 survey, 76 percent of respondents age 50+ indicated a desire
to remain in their current home as long as possible (Binette and Vasold
2018). These preferences are consistent with data: for example, from 2012
to 2014, only 1.8 percent of homeowners age 65+ extracted equity by selling
their homes (Goodman et al. 2017). Of older adults who sold their homes
between 1998 and 2014, only about one in four purchased a home of lesser value, allowing for liquidation of home equity (Begley and Chan 2019).
Those who did sell their homes tended to have higher incomes and more
nonhousing financial wealth (Englehardt and Eriksen 2019).
An important reason that homeowners do not sell their homes is that
their retirement consumption is tied to the home’s value, and owning a
home provides a hedge against outliving their assets. That is, the home is not
simply a financial asset that can be tapped at will, it is also an asset that pays
a ‘dividend’ in the form of imputed rent. Thus, selling the home creates a
challenge: how to invest the proceeds from a sale to ensure sufficient returns
to pay rent over the remaining lifetime. Seniors who rent bear the risk of
running out of money if they live a long time or financial returns are not
what they expect. This might explain why homeownership rates across most
developed countries peak at age 65–74 (around 75% to 90%), regardless of
the mortgage finance or pension systems (Goodman and Mayer 2018).
Accordingly, there appears to be an appreciable number of older borrowers who fit into categories that might benefit from taking an equity
release product like a reverse mortgage. Some are the traditional ‘house
rich, cash poor’ households or those who want to eliminate mortgage payments. Others might want to access liquidity from home equity rather than
selling financial assets, effectively ending up with a portfolio that becomes
increasingly concentrated in home equity with age.

Market size and growth of equity release in the US,
the UK, and Canada
In the aggregate, the total value of home equity for seniors is quite large.
In the US, home equity seniors age 62 had a total of $7.54 trillion in Q1
2020 (NRMLA 2020). Home equity for seniors in large European countries
exceeded €8 trillion in 2013 according to Haurin and Moulton (2017). By
comparison, the aggregate value of equity release products is much smaller.
While aggregate data on equity release products in many countries is difficult to obtain, we can summarize the reverse mortgage market in the US
and compare it to two growing markets including those of Canada and the
UK.5 The number of reverse mortgages in the US is small and sensitive to
market and policy dynamics affecting who can borrow and the proceeds
available. In the UK and Canada, equity release markets are much larger as
a share of the elderly population.
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Source: Authors’ calculations.

For the US, we examine the market for HECM reverse mortgages, or
loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency of
the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). While
there is also a small private-label reverse mortgage program, over this period, it is estimated that 96 to 100 percent of all reverse mortgages were
HECMs, and systematic data were not available prior to 2018.6
Figure 13.1 charts the volume of HECM reverse mortgages since the
program became permanent in 1998. As is apparent, the growth in the number of reverse mortgages (LHS axis, white bars) in the US has been hump
shaped and has suffered an appreciable decline in the last decade. Right
before and after the global financial crisis of 2008, reverse mortgage production peaked at nearly 115,000 reverse mortgages, accounting for under
0.5 percent of older homeowners. With about 10,000 people turning 65
every day in the US, the share taking out a reverse mortgage is still well
under one percent of the eligible population during most years of the sample. The growth during the financial crisis is not surprising; seniors who
watched their stock portfolios collapse seemed ever more willing to turn to
their homes to help finance retirement, even as home prices were falling. As
well, there was a large increase in traditional mortgage debt during the mid2000s, leaving many older borrowers with relatively big mortgage payments
that they could eliminate with a reverse mortgage.
After the 2008 peak, reverse mortgage originations plummeted for more
than a decade, with tighter underwriting, lower borrowing proceeds, and
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the exit of many brand name originators. Until 2014, the FHA did not
require financial underwriting for borrowers. While there are no required
mortgage payments for a reverse mortgage, borrowers must still pay property taxes and insurance (T&I) to be in compliance, and an appreciable
number of borrowers from 2009 to 2012 took out full draws and were left
with no money to cover these costs. This led to a sharp increase in defaults
and FHA-required foreclosures on borrowers unable to make homeowner’s property T&I payments, with attendant poor publicity. With these and
other challenges, larger financial institutions such as Wells Fargo, Bank of
America, and MetLife exited the reverse mortgage business.
The increase in defaults and foreclosures and sharp decline in home
values led the FHA to reassess its underwriting and curtail available proceeds for borrowers as a share of home value. The maximum amount of
proceeds for an HECM is called the ‘principal limit’ (PL) or the share of
home value that can be used as a borrowing base. To protect itself, the FHA
lowered the principal limit factor (PLF)—the proportion of home equity
that can be borrowed; similar to an LTV—substantially between 2012 and
2017. While the average home value for HECM borrowers (called maximum
claim amount, or MCA) grew 30 percent between 2009 and 2019, the PL
did not grow at all.7 In addition, in 2015, the FHA limited the amount of
money that a borrower could get to 60 percent of the PLF, unless the borrower had a mortgage or other required property or federal tax liens with
an amount above the 60 percent limit, in which case the borrower could
cover these ‘mandatory obligations’ plus an additional 10 percent (capped
at 100% of the PL). The effective reduction in proceeds available to borrowers, combined with the exit of brand name financial institutions, led to
a sharp decline in the number of HECM mortgages originated.
By comparison, originations of equity release products in Canada and the
UK followed a very different pattern, more than doubling since 2013. In the
UK, equity release offerings increased from £1 billion in 2013 to £3billion
in 2017, with a further 32 percent growth to more than £4 billion by 2019.8
Furthermore, equity release mortgages represent an estimated 36 percent of
all mortgages for borrowers over age 55 in 2018, doubling their share from
the previous decade. A total of 46,000 equity release plans were originated
in 2018 versus fewer than 42,000 in the US, despite the US having almost
five times the number of retirees. While total volume in 2019 was flat with
2,018, the membership in the Equity Release Council almost doubled and,
prior to COVID-19, the industry expected continued growth in 2020.
In Canada, HomeEquity Bank, the sole seller of reverse mortgages until
recently, reported a record CA$820 million up from CA$309 million five
years earlier. As in the UK, mortgages are available for borrowers age 55
and above, although the bulk of originations are for those over age 65. In
both the UK and Canada, lenders advertise widely in the media. In the UK,
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equity release products are offered by some of the largest life insurance
companies.

Home Equity and the Market for Reverse
Mortgages
Reverse mortgage originations in the US
The current number of outstanding reverse mortgages in the US is small,
estimated to be below two percent of older homeowners.9 In general, it is
difficult to measure the home equity market for older adults. Surveys such as
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) lack details about mortgage types
and terms, and they rely on self-reported data on loan balances. These data
are good for tracking trends in the stock of mortgage debt held by older
homeowners, but they are less useful for examining new originations and,
in particular, the share of reverse mortgages versus other mortgage products. Researchers also use consumer credit panel datasets to track trends in
home equity borrowing among older adults over time (Moulton et al. 2019;
Brown et. al. 2020). However, credit data do not include borrower-specific
information on home values and do not include important information
about loan terms and costs. Further, reverse mortgages are not reported
in credit data because they do not require borrowers to make payments.
Below, we examine data on the vast majority of new mortgages originated in the US using the 2018 HMDA Loan Application Register (LAR).
Under HMDA, lenders are required to collect and report specific information about mortgage applications acted upon and loans purchased during
the prior calendar year. Beginning in 2018, new reporting requirements
came into effect that required most lenders to report on mortgages structured as open-ended lines of credit, such as HELOCs and reverse mortgages
that were previously only voluntarily reported (CFPB 2019).10 Importantly,
the 2018 HMDA data include new information on both federally insured
HECMs and proprietary reverse mortgages, as well as the age of borrowers,
so we can compare various types of borrowing used by seniors.
The 2018 HMDA data allows us to compare the characteristics of applicants and borrowers of reverse mortgages to the characteristics of mortgage
applicants and borrowers for other types of loans. The goal is twofold: first,
to understand the characteristics of reverse mortgage borrowers; and second, to compare reverse mortgage borrowers to applicants for all other
mortgage debt taken out by potential borrowers age 62 and older who might
otherwise have been eligible for a reverse mortgage.11

Data description
We begin by restricting the HMDA database to those observations where
the applicant or co-applicant is age 62+, as we wish to focus on older
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adults who would otherwise be eligible for a reverse mortgage. To avoid
double counting, we exclude loans that were simply purchased by another institution during the reporting period. We further restrict the sample
to loans for single family, owner-occupied properties, excluding investment properties and second homes. These restrictions result in a sample of
2,510,080 loan applications, of which 1,329,505 resulted in loan originations
during the 2018 period.
Table 13.1 provides a breakdown of observations by loan type and loan
outcome. We separate loan observations into seven different mortgage
types. The first three mortgage types are reverse mortgages, including
‘traditional HECMs,’ HECMs used to purchase a property (‘HECMs for
Purchase’), and non-HECM proprietary reverse mortgages (‘Other Reverse
Mortgages’). Prior to the 2008 housing crisis, there was a nascent market
for proprietary reverse mortgages, but this market more or less disappeared
after 2008. In the last few years, a small proprietary reverse mortgage market has developed, but it became more substantial in 2018 when several
lenders began offering the product. Proprietary reverse mortgages are mostly concentrated among higher value homes that exceed the property value
limits for an HECM12 or for condominiums that do not qualify for the FHA’s
HECM program.
The other four categories represent different types of traditional (or forward) mortgages; that is, mortgages that require a monthly payment and
must be paid off over a fixed term. Two categories offer the borrower the
option to take out cash. The first category includes home equity lines of
credit and loans. HELOCs include new loans structured as an LOC, where
the borrower typically makes interest-only payments at an adjustable rate on
borrowings up to an approved credit limit for 10 years, followed by a payback
period, usually 15 years, where the borrower must pay back the outstanding
amount. The cost of originating a HELOC is quite low and HELOC borrowers tend to have very good credit scores. ‘Second liens’ are loans that are
defined as second liens excluding lines of credit and loans with a purpose of
refinancing. These loans typically have a fixed rate and payoff period and
are often given to borrowers with riskier credit histories and have higherthan-average interest rates. The second category of equity extraction loans
includes first mortgages. ‘Cash-out refinancing’ is defined to include loans
originated for the purpose of cash-out refinancing that are not structured
as a LOC and are typically paid back over 15–30 years. ‘First liens not for
purchase’ are closed liens in first position that are not for the purpose of
refinancing or for home purchase.
The remaining two types of mortgages do not involve the borrower
obtaining additional cash. ‘Refinance no cash’ loans include both closed
and open lines of credit for the stated purpose of refinancing without
cash-out, excluding loans for the purchase of a home. Finally, ‘purchase

Credit history
Debt to
income ratio

Reason for Denial

Application Status
Originated
Number of
originated
loans
Denied
Withdrawn or
incomplete
N

2,517

51,493

0.074
0.048

0.075
0.15

0.167
0.271

0.088
0.05

0.776
1,952

HECM
for
purchase

0.562
28,946

HECM
traditional

0.062
0.026

3,021

0.128
0.18

0.646
1,952

Other
reverse
mortgage

0.407
0.506

563,653

0.365
0.148

0.487
274,388

HELOC
or second

0.296
0.303

720,251

0.245
0.29

0.465
334,791

Cash-out
first lien

0.273
0.388

534,572

0.237
0.261

0.502
268,210

Refinance
no cash

0.322
0.376
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Table 13.1 Mortgage applications reported in 2018 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act for applicants or co-applicants age 62+
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Note: Sample is restricted to loans for single family, owner-occupied properties where the applicant or co-applicant is age 62 or older, excluding
investment properties and second homes.
Source: Authors’ calculations from 2018 HMDA data, excluding purchased loans.
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mortgages’ are closed-end loans with the stated purpose of home purchase.
In both cases, the bulk of such mortgages involved fixed rates (although
some are also hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages, or ARMs) and a payback
period that is usually 30 years, although some traditional mortgages may
have a shorter 15-year payback period.
Of the modes of extracting home equity, HELOC and second liens are
slightly more common in 2008 than cash-out refinancing or first liens not
for purchase. Both options are quite a bit more prevalent than HECMs.

Reasons for loan denial: Older versus younger borrowers
Table 13.1 also compares the proportion of applications denied or approved
by the lender, as well as those considered incomplete or withdrawn by
the applicant. Rates of denial were highest for HELOCs and second liens,
with more than one-third of older applicants in 2018 being denied. About
one-fourth of cash-out refinancing and first lien mortgages were denied.
Notably, having a weak credit history or high DTI ratio were the top reasons
for denial among these applicants, with more than half of HELOC denials
being due to an inability to afford the monthly payments (e.g. high DTI).
By contrast, reverse mortgage applications were less likely to be denied,
with primary reasons for denial being related to the collateral value of the
property or insufficient cash to cover required costs.
These differences in reasons for loan denial make sense, given that
reverse mortgages carry different criteria for underwriting than forward
mortgages. There is no required monthly repayment of a reverse mortgage,
and thus there is no additional DTI burden from a reverse mortgage. Beginning in 2015, HECM borrowers must demonstrate the ability to pay ongoing
property T&I payments or have sufficient home equity to set aside funds to
pay these expenses in an escrow-type account at the time of loan closing
(Moulton and Haurin 2019). The primary barrier to obtaining a reverse
mortgage is not poor credit history or lack of income, but lack of sufficient
home equity (Moulton et al. 2017). Any existing mortgage debt on a home
at the time of application for a reverse mortgage must be paid off with the
proceeds of the reverse mortgage or in cash at closing.
To give additional perspectives on the reasons that seniors are turned
down for mortgage credit, Figure 13.2 compares reasons for denial of
mortgage applications by applicant age, including applicants age 45 and
younger, age 46 to 61, and age 62 and older. Here, it is clear that inability
to afford the monthly payment is a more substantial barrier to originating
a mortgage for older adults than it is for younger cohorts. For example,
more than 50 percent of older adults denied HELOC and second loans
were denied them due to inability to afford monthly payments, compared
with only 35 percent of those age 45 and younger. For younger applicants,
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Figure 13.2 Denied Home Mortgage Disclosure Act applications by age, loan type,
and reason for denial, 2018
Source: Author’s calculations from 2018 HMDA data.

a poor credit history is a more common reason for denial across all loan
types.
We next consider the proportion of mortgage applicants with DTI ratios
greater than 41 percent, which is a typical maximum DTI for underwriting.
Figure 13.3 compares older and younger applicants by loan type, including
both those with originated loans and those with loans that were denied. The
proportion of older applicants with high DTI ratios is striking—70 percent
of older applicants denied HELOC or second liens had DTIs greater than
41 percent. Across all loan types, a higher share of older applicants—both
originated and denied—have high DTIs compared to younger applicants.
High debt incurred at younger ages appears to be an appreciable barrier
to additional borrowing or consumer home equity at older ages. At an age
where income will eventually fall as applicants start to retire, debt burdens
remain quite high.

Characteristics of older borrowers
Table 13.2 summarizes the loan and borrower characteristics for originated reverse mortgage loans, reported in the 2018 HMDA data, compared to
loan and borrower characteristics for traditional mortgage originations to
borrowers age 62+ in the 2018 HMDA data. These data include information for 30,898 HECM loan originations, of which 28,946 were structured
as traditional HECMs and 1,952 as HECMs to purchase a home.13 An
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Figure 13.3 Denied Home Mortgage Disclosure Act applications by age and loan
type, % with debt to income ratio > 41 percent, 2018
Source: Author’s calculations from 2018 HMDA data.

additional 1952 non-HECM proprietary reverse mortgages are reported in
the 2018 HMDA data.
The loan amount reported in the HMDA data for a reverse mortgage is
the initial principal limit (IPL), or the maximum amount of home equity
available to a borrower based on the borrower’s age, expected interest rate,
and home value. For HECMs, HUD establishes a PLF, which is the maximum
LTV ratio at origination. The PLF is multiplied by the value of the property
or the limit set by the FHA, whichever is lower, to determine the IPL.14 In
2018, the property value limit was $679,650. Borrowers with homes worth
more than this limit may have access to a larger share of their home equity
from a proprietary reverse mortgage.
The average loan amounts for traditional HECMs ($165,751) and
HECMs for purchase ($174,918) are much lower than the average loan
amount of $703,735 for proprietary reverse mortgages. This is not surprising, given that the average property value of proprietary reverse mortgage
borrowers in 2018 was $1.66 million, compared with an average home value
of $358,011 for traditional HECMs and $362,701 for HECMs used to purchase a home. The average HECM borrower had a slightly higher LTV of
0.48, compared to 0.44 for proprietary reverse mortgage borrowers. In 2018,
the average interest rate for HECM borrowers was about two percentage
points lower than the rate for proprietary reverse mortgage borrowers.
With regard to demographic characteristics, traditional HECM borrowers were more likely to be Black or Hispanic, compared to HECM for
purchase or other proprietary reverse mortgage borrowers. They were also
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Notes: The summary statistics are based on lender reported values, where values not reported are treated as missing. An exception is the loan amount
(IPL) and LTV, where we estimate an age and interest rate adjusted PLF and replace values where the loan amount/MCA is not within 0.10 of the
PLF, this resulting in replacement of 26 percent of the values. The sample sizes are smaller for particular variables with missing data or outliers.
Source: Authors’ calculations from 2018 HMDA data, excluding purchased loans.
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more likely to be single, to have a lower income to underwrite the loan,
and be located in a lower income census tract—although still slightly above
the median income for the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Compared
to either type of HECM borrower, proprietary reverse mortgage borrowers
tend to be older and from higher income census tracts as a percentage of
the MSA median income.
Next we compare reverse mortgage borrowers to those who take other
types of mortgages. The average property value of $433,561 for HELOCs
and second liens and $393,734 for cash-out refinancing or new first liens not
for purchase is higher than the average traditional HECM property value of
$358,011. The average loan amount for HELOC and second lien borrowers
of $108,918 is smaller than the average loan amount of HECM borrowers.
It is important to note that an appreciable share of the HELOC and second
loan borrowers held existing first mortgages, as the combined LTV for all
mortgages on the property of 0.55 is considerably higher than the LTV of
0.30 for the HELOC or second loan by itself.
The average interest rate of HELOC and second loans of 5.93 percent is a bit higher than the 4.8 percent interest rate on HECM loans,
which becomes 5.3 percent when we add the 0.5 percent mortgage insurance premium (MIP) that must also be paid on an FHA-insured HECM.
This insurance fee also exists for traditional FHA loans, where the MIP
is also unreported, but also for traditional Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
loans with an LTV above 80 percent where there is a required private
mortgage insurance (PMI) policy. Loan costs are not reported in HMDA
for reverse mortgages or HELOCs, but they are reported for closed-end
forward mortgages, with average up-front costs of about $4,500 for cashout refinancing and purchase mortgages, or about 2 percent of loan
proceeds.
Notably, the average combined LTV for the cash-out loan types ranges
between 55 (HELOC and second loans) and 63 percent (cash-out refinancing and nonpurchase first mortgages). This is striking, given the size of
mortgage debt owed over a repayment period of 25 to 30 years, extending
into borrowers’ 90s and beyond. Such borrowers are taking on mortgage
payments as a share of home value that are nearly as large as much younger
borrowers who have a much longer expected working period.
Consistent with the perception of having strong credit requirements,
HELOC borrowers also appear to have higher income characteristics than
do reverse mortgage or other cash-out borrowers. HECM borrowers live
in lower income census tracts (107% of MSA median) versus cash-out
refinancing or nonpurchase first liens (112%) or HELOCs and second
liens (120%). HELOC and second lien borrowers are less likely to be Black
or Hispanic (10.5%) than cash-out first lien borrowers (15.8%), who are
closer to the traditional HECM minority share of 15 percent. Strikingly,
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HECM borrowers are almost twice as likely to be single female (40%) versus
approximately 22 percent of HELOC and second lien borrowers.
When we examine traditional purchase or refinance mortgages, HECM
borrowers have a similar share to Black or Hispanic borrowers (13–15%)
and also almost double the share of single female borrowers. Furthermore, those in neighborhoods for refinancing and purchase mortgages
have higher incomes relative to their MSA compared to HECM census tracts.

HECM simulations using 2018 HMDA data
Next, we leverage the HMDA data to estimate a series of counterfactual simulations to determine whether applicants in the HMDA data could have
obtained HECMs instead of the mortgages actually chosen. The simulations
focus on the size of the loan requested without taking credit into account.
In part, this is because we do not observe borrower credit indicators across
all loan types. Nevertheless, relatively few HECM borrowers are rejected due
to low credit for two reasons. First, since HECMs do not have required principal and interest payments, borrowers must only show the ability to pay
property T&I, a much lower income standard. Second, HECM borrowers
with a poor credit history or low income can always choose to take a lower IPL and set aside borrowing proceeds to pay future T&I.15 Thus, HECM
borrowers can have a poor credit history or low income and still qualify for
the loan.
To examine eligibility for an HECM, we determine the amount of money
a borrower could qualify for using the initial PLF tables from the HECM
program in 2018. Inputs to the IPL tables include the age of the youngest
borrower and the property value, estimates of which are reported in HMDA.
For the expected interest rate on an HECM loan, another input required
for the PLF table, we use two different values as described below. We compare the loan size requested through a forward mortgage with what we
estimate the borrower could have obtained with an HECM.
We run the simulation with two different sets of assumptions regarding
the HECM expected interest rate and loan costs. The first scenario is a
conservative estimate, with the maximum permissible loan origination fee
and an expected interest rate of 4.75 percent (the median rate in 2018).
The second scenario relaxes some of these assumptions, waiving the lender
origination fee and using an expected interest rate of three percent.
The lower interest rate in the second scenario is important, as borrowers are able to obtain the maximum possible proceeds in the PLF table by
gaining access to a lower interest rate loan. In practice, borrowers who shop
around are often able to obtain more preferable terms on an HECM, including lower rates and thus higher loan proceeds. Also, lenders are often willing
to offer borrowers a lower interest rate on their HECMs if the borrowers take
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more proceeds. This is especially true where the lower rate allows a borrower
to obtain an HECM when, at a higher rate, that borrower would not obtain
sufficient proceeds to pay off a previous lien. The second scenario would be
particularly relevant in times when the 10-year treasury rate falls below that
in 2019, when rates peaked above three percent, compared to average rates
that were 0.5 to 1 percent lower in the other years between 2016 and 2019.
In 2020, with COVID-19 and recent Fed moves, many reverse mortgages
are being originated at or near the three percent rate that obtains a maximum PLF. Recent experience along with the data in this chapter suggest
that demand for reverse mortgages may be quite sensitive to interest rates
due to the much larger proceeds available in lower interest rate economic
environments.
We conduct the simulations for both originated forward mortgages and
for applications for forward mortgages that were denied—the latter being
a group of older adults with an expressed preference for borrowing from
home equity who were unable to do so through the mortgage type selected.
The results for originated forward mortgages and for denied applications
can be seen in Table 13.3.
To illustrate our approach, consider the case of HELOC and second lien
originations in Table 13.3. Based on the age of the youngest borrower and
an expected interest rate of 4.75 percent, the estimated average PLF is 0.457
percent (top section of Table 13.3). Multiplying this factor by the borrower’s
property value or the loan limit of $679,650 (whichever is less) results in an
average maximum HECM loan amount (IPL) of $158,258. Note that reducing the expected interest rate to 3 percent (bottom section of Table 13.3)
increases the PLF by nearly 10 percentage points, raising the maximum loan
amount to $192,299.
We then calculate the borrower-specific up-front costs associated with an
HECM, comprised of lender origination fees, an up-front MIP charged by
HUD, and standard closing costs (e.g. appraisal and closing fees). For the
simulation at the top of Table 13.3, we assume that the maximum origination fee is assessed by a lender at an average of $4,711 for HELOC and
second lien borrowers in our sample.16 We waive the origination fee in the
bottom of Table 13.3, as this fee is assessed at a lender’s discretion and
lenders might choose not to charge it for borrowers who take large proceeds and also comparison shop on prices. The up-front MIP is currently
set by HUD at two percent of the home value, amounting to $6,951 for the
average HELOC or second lien borrower in our sample. We also include an
estimated $2,500 for standard closing costs,17 resulting in total estimated
up-front costs of $14,162 for the average HELOC borrower (top section),
or $9,451 with the origination fee waived (bottom section).
It is important to note that the MIP for an HECM buys some protections
not available for other types of mortgages, especially HELOCs. All HECMs
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are non-recourse, which means that borrowers, their heirs, and lenders are
not responsible for anything owed on the HECM balance beyond the value of the home. By contrast, for HELOCs, borrowers in most states bear
personal liability for any negative equity. Personal liability is a feature of
almost all second liens and some first lien mortgages, depending on the
state. Also, HELOCs are subject to being suspended in an environment of
falling home prices, whereas the HECM LOC will not be cut if home prices
decline (although the LOC can be suspended if a borrower fails to meet
other reverse mortgage obligations such as making timely payment of property T&I, adequately maintaining the home, and living in the home as their
primary residence).
To estimate the total loan amount from the HECM, we add together the
borrower’s requested loan amount for the forward mortgage, any existing
mortgage debt held by the borrower in addition to the new loan being
requested (e.g. the balance on a first mortgage for borrowers requesting
a second lien or HELOC), and the estimated HECM closing costs. We then
divide this amount by the borrower’s property value or the MCA (whichever
is lower) to get the estimated LTV if the borrower were to obtain an HECM.
If the estimated LTV is less than the estimated PLF, the borrower could
obtain an HECM. For HELOC and second lien borrowers, the ratio averages 0.643 (top panel) or 0.627 percent (bottom panel), which exceeds the
estimated maximum PLF by an average of 0.186 (top panel) or 0.072 percent (bottom panel). At an expected interest rate of 4.75 percent and with
the full origination fee, we estimate that 28 percent of HELOC and second lien borrowers could have obtained an HECM. At an expected rate of
three percent with no origination fee, this proportion increases to about 40
percent of HELOC and second lien originations.
Across all loan types, we estimate that about 17 to 27 percent of older
adults originating mortgages in 2018 could have obtained an HECM for the
same loan amount obtained through a forward mortgage, corresponding
to a total of 225,000 to 350,000 older adults. A key reason that a majority
of borrowers may be choosing a traditional mortgage is simply that they
are borrowing too much money to choose an HECM. In other words, the
large required debt means that an HECM was not an option for at least
three-quarters of older mortgage borrowers in 2018.
Equally interesting is that roughly the same proportion of rejected borrowers
may have qualified for an HECM as for actual borrowers. The simulations
in the right hand columns of Table 13.3 indicate that 17 to 25 percent
of denied forward mortgage borrowers would have sufficient home equity
to originate an HECM at their requested loan amount, corresponding to
98,000 to 147,000 older adults. For the rejected borrowers, an HECM would
have made the difference between getting and not getting a mortgage, while
at the same time eliminating the required mortgage payment.
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Next, we examine the characteristics of forward mortgage applicants
who originated or were rejected for loans, but who had sufficient home
equity to obtain an HECM for the requested loan amount at an expected interest rate of 3 percent and no origination fee.18 Table 13.4 reports
summary statistics for originated loans (left hand columns) and rejected
borrowers (right hand columns). Both groups had lower LTVs than average for the loan type, which is not surprising given that the HECM LTVs
are lower than those of other mortgages that require principal and interest
payments.
Nonetheless, an HECM could have helped many of the borrowers and
rejected applicants. For rejected borrowers, nearly half were denied the loan
because the resulting DTI ratio from having a monthly mortgage payment
would have been too high. Based on HMDA characteristics, 56 to 66 percent
of the rejected applicants would have a DTI of 41 percent or more if they
obtained a forward mortgage. Even among those who took out a new mortgage, 28 to 32 percent had DTIs greater than 41 percent, leverage ratios that
are very high for borrowers at retirement age and likely to have reductions
in income as they get older and possibly become unable to work. Aside from
having very high DTI ratios, rejected applicants were also older, more likely
to be Black or Hispanic, and from lower income census tracts compared to
the full population of forward mortgage borrowers.

Summary of Findings
In conclusion, five key findings are worth noting: (1) Older (forward) mortgage borrowers tend to be taking on quite a bit of debt, with an average
LTV of 55 (HELOC or second liens) to 78 percent (purchase mortgages).
(2) Mortgage rates are similar for HECMs relative to other cash-out refinancing and traditional mortgage types, almost all averaging 4.8 to 5.9
percent, although reverse mortgages are much more likely to be adjustable
versus fixed rate. (3) Reverse mortgage borrowers are almost twice as likely
to be single women (40%) compared to other older mortgage borrowers,
have a similar share of minority borrowers, and live in slightly higher income
communities relative to the MSA median. (4) Only 17 to 27 percent of actual and rejected borrowers would have qualified for an HECM, depending
on the interest rate and closing costs of the HECM, though this would represent 301,000 to 460,000 borrowers, it is still nine to 14 times the size of
the actual HECM market. Even the number of rejected traditional mortgage borrowers who might have obtained an HECM was 2.6 to 3.9 times the
actual number of reverse mortgage borrowers. (5) A large share of actual
and rejected borrowers had very high DTI ratios, with 71 percent of rejected
borrowers and 40 percent of actual borrowers having a DTI over 36 percent.
An HECM could have substantially lowered debt payments for this group.

Estimated HECM Loan Characteristics
Estimated
14,367
HECM total
up-front costs
Mortgage
28,151
debt to be
laid off with
HECM
Estimated
121,877
loan amount
with HECM
Estimated
0.352
HECM loan
to value or
MCA

Originated
HELOC
or
second

14,043

9,426

126,119

0.378

2,886

137,240

0.393

Refinance
no cash

14,367

Cashout
first
lien

0.416

146,099

1,199

14,614

Purchase
mortgage

0.341

116,158

29,820

9,443

Denied
HELOC
or
second

0.394

127,654

2,840

9,056

Cash-out
first lien

0.391

136,829

12,106

9,705

Refinance
no cash

Continued

0.419

140,483

2,074

9,292

Purchase
mortgage

Table 13.4 Summary characteristics of 2018 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act applicants, would qualify for Home Equity Conversion
Mortgage at 3.0 rate

Reasons for Denial
Reason for
denial: credit
history
Reason for
denial: debt
to income
Select HMDA Characteristics
Loan amount
84,159
(or IPL
for reverse
mortgage)
Property
392,938
value
Combined
0.303
loan to value
ratio
Loan to value
0.243
ratio for this
loan

Originated
HELOC
or
second

Table 13.4 Continued

107,360

378,220
0.33

0.313

387,937

0.346

0.345

Refinance
no cash

124,789

Cashout
first
lien

0.379

0.375

366,373

135,290

Purchase
mortgage

0.229

0.291

411,596

0.345

0.345

362,212

115,757

0.33

0.489

76,895

0.31

Cash-out
first lien

0.453

Denied
HELOC
or
second

0.321

0.341

414,666

115,018

0.448

0.279

Refinance
no cash

0.377

0.373

367,910

129,116

0.391

0.18

Purchase
mortgage

Interest rate
Interest rate
spread
Total loan
costs
Percent
reporting
total loan
costs
Black or
Hispanic
Borrower
gender: single
female

4.596
0.593

2,916

0.954

0.141

0.294

4.933
0.212

266

0.048

0.101

0.273

0.264

0.099

0.488

2,151

4.402
0.157

0.262

0.079

0.973

3,259

4.548
0.361

0.366

0.262

0

.

.
.

0.323

0.219

0

.

.
.

0.339

0.192

0

.

.
.

Continued

0.307

0.143

0

.

.
.

76,507
118.2

0.476
0.201
0.323
95.983

30.44

75,855

114.5

84,555

0.528
0.178
0.294
85.339

24.953

76,359

118.7

106,016

93,595

24.762

0.545
0.167
0.288
81.46

0.499

0.424

0.489

0.178

0.201

Refinance
no cash

0.186

Cashout
first
lien

Source: Authors’ calculations from 2018 HMDA data.

Borrower
gender: single
male
Borrower
gender: joint
female and
male
DTI <36%
DTI 36-41%
DTI >41%
Income
used for
underwriting
Census tract
% minority
MSA median
family income
Census tract
income to
MSA income
%
Observations

Originated
HELOC
or
second

Table 13.4 Continued

46,277

121.3

73,423

22.963

0.536
0.183
0.281
172.578

0.537

0.146

Purchase
mortgage

66,973

110.9

75,945

37.041

0.259
0.08
0.66
63.702

0.299

0.289

Denied
HELOC
or
second

29,539

107.6

73,784

35.772

0.318
0.116
0.566
57.666

0.268

0.319

Cash-out
first lien

30,927

113.2

77,235

33.29

0.26
0.087
0.653
58.215

0.313

0.273

Refinance
no cash

2,869

105.7

66,359

24.814

0.308
0.106
0.586
65.481

0.389

0.214

Purchase
mortgage
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What about older borrowers with an existing mortgage?
In other work, Moulton and Haurin (2019) examined the potential size of
the HECM market among older Americans with a mortgage. They found
that in 2016, at least half of existing older homeowners with a mortgage
would have been able to take out an HECM: at least five million households in total. This much larger group was still making mortgage payments,
although only a minority appeared to have a DTI as high as the new
mortgage borrowers in our sample above.

Why Older People Do Not Use Reverse
Mortgages
The large proportion of older adults for whom home equity is their primary source of wealth, combined with growing levels of consumer and
mortgage debt held by older adults—and resulting increases in their DTI
burden—presents a puzzle: why do older adults in the US not turn to
reverse mortgages more often? In this section, we consider several reasons
why this may be the case, including why people may be reluctant to spend
down home equity generally in retirement as well as reasons specific to the
institutional features of the American reverse mortgage market.

Reluctance to consume home equity in retirement
It is well-established that people tend to not spend down their wealth
in retirement as would be predicted by a simple life cycle hypothesis
(Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010, 2016;
Lockwood 2018). Housing wealth is no exception, and in fact it tends
to be the last asset consumed, typically only near the end of life following a major health event or the death of a spouse (Venti and Wise 1990,
2004; Poterba et al. 2011, 2017; Mayer 2017; Englehardt and Eriksen 2019).
Financial wealth is more liquid and accessible than housing wealth, without the transaction costs of selling the home or taking out a loan. There
are also numerous financial and tax incentives to spend down financial
wealth before housing wealth, including housing wealth being treated more
favorably by tax policy when left as a bequest.
The economics literature generally suggests two interrelated reasons for
holding on to wealth in retirement: (1) precautionary savings for uncertain health costs, including long-term care; and (2) Importantly, these
motivations do not necessarily preclude borrowing from home equity in
retirement. For example, retaining home equity as precautionary savings
for major health expenses suggests that homeowners anticipate being
able to liquidate home equity when a health shock occurs. Nevertheless,
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such motivations may help explain the timing and nature of home equity
consumption in retirement.
Health costs in retirement can be considerable. While the majority of
older adults receive Medicare, nearly 20 percent of health expenditures
are paid for as out-of-pocket costs (De Nardi, French, Jones, and McCauley
2016). Recent estimates indicate that the average 65-year-old man or woman needs $72,000 or $93,000 (respectively) to have a 50 percent chance of
being able to cover necessary health expenses in retirement; for those who
experience major health shocks, this could exceed $350,000 (Fronstin and
VanDerhei 2017). Further, more than half of older adults will require longterm care in a nursing home or at home prior to death (Favreault and Dey
2015; Hurd et al. 2013, with average lifetime costs of $133,700 in 2015 dollars
(Favreault and Dey 2015).
Despite these risks, few households purchase long-term care insurance;
instead viewing home equity as a precautionary saving to cover such costs
if they do arise (Costa-Font et al. 2018; Davidoff 2010). Indeed, evidence
indicates that home equity is one of the main resources used to pay for
long-term care in the US (Costa-Font et al. 2018), with Medicaid covering
costs for 60 percent of nursing home residents (Borella et al. 2018). Medicaid policy further incentivizes older homeowners to hold assets in the form
of home equity rather than as liquid wealth. To qualify for Medicaid, households must spend down their financial assets to a minimum set by states,
typically around $2,000, but home equity is typically exempt from eligibility
thresholds (Ricks 2018). Therefore, older adults with a high probability of
needing long-term care (and potentially having to rely on Medicaid to pay
for such services) may have a strategic incentive to spend down or transfer financial wealth, and to save remaining wealth in the form of home
equity.
In line with a precautionary savings motive, recent studies document a
decline in home equity after a health shock (Gilligan et al. 2018; Gupta
et al. 2018; Poterba et al. 2018), with home equity being second only to
formal health insurance for financing health-related consumption after a
health shock in later life (Dalton and LaFave 2017). The ability to access
home equity is also linked to better health outcomes. In an analysis of cancer
patients, Gupta et al. (2018) found that cancer patients who borrowed from
their home equity were 23 percent were more likely to perform necessary
treatments and had lower rates of mortality than those who did not borrow
from home equity.
In addition, a desire to leave a bequest to heirs may prevent spending
from home equity in retirement; in fact, this need not be a separate
motivation and can actually reinforce precautionary savings. For example,
adults who intend to leave a bequest but are uncertain of their future health
risks may prefer to self-insure through precautionary savings rather than
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purchase long-term care insurance or spend down their financial assets to
qualify for Medicaid (Lockwood 2018).
Whether intended or unintended, a large proportion of older adults
do leave home equity to their heirs when they die: bequests from home
equity totaled an estimated $90 to $100 billion per year from 1992 to 2014
(Englehardt and Erikson 2019). Several economists have estimated structural models to parse out the importance of an intentional bequest motive,
relative to other factors that might lead older adults to retain wealth in
retirement (De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010, 2016; Ameriks et al. 2011;
De Nardi, French, Jones, and McCauley 2016; Lockwood 2018; Nakajima
and Telyukova 2020). These models generally indicate that, while bequests
are certainly an important factor in explaining wealth holding, they do not
explain everything. For instance, Nakajima and Telyukova (2020) estimated
that bequest motives explained about 7 to 28 percent of median net worth
in retirement, depending on the individual’s age—well below the amount
of home equity left to heirs at death.
Structural models estimating demand for reverse mortgages predict
higher home equity use for those with weaker bequest motives, elders who
have low levels of financial wealth relative to housing wealth, and for those
with relatively high levels of pre-existing debt (Nakajima and Telyukova
2017; Cocco and Lopes 2019). Health expenditures are complicated: on
the one hand, those with high uncertainty regarding future health costs
are predicted to retain home equity as precautionary savings. On the other hand, those with high health expenditures due to underlying health
conditions or the onset of a health shock may have a higher demand for borrowing through a reverse mortgage to help pay for health-related expenses
(Nakajima and Telyukova 2017).
Despite a general tendency to hold more wealth than would be predicted
following a life cycle model, as demonstrated above, older adults can and
do extract equity in retirement—they just more commonly use other debt
instruments rather than reverse mortgages to do so. As we discussed earlier,
this is not the case in some countries like the UK or Canada, where equity
release products are much more widely used by older borrowers. Furthermore, these countries saw sharp rises in the use of equity release through
2019, a pattern similar to the large growth of reverse mortgages in the US
through 2009; nevertheless, the growth in Canada and the UK occurred during an economic boom, versus during a downturn in the US. The uneven
economic pattern combined with sharp increases and decreases in equity release usage over a few years is inconsistent with a bequest motive or
precautionary savings as the main explanation for why US retirees do not
choose equity release more often. This raises questions about the institutional features of reverse mortgages and the market in the US that may be
impeding their use.
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Institutional features of reverse mortgages in the US
One longstanding claim is that high costs limit demand for reverse mortgages; in particular, there are substantial costs associated with taking out
these loans (Lucas 2015; Nakajima and Telyukova 2017). Traditional reverse
mortgages do carry up-front costs that are larger than up-front costs associated with other home equity borrowing options. For HECMs, this is primarily
due to the up-front MIP charged by HUD, which is currently set at 2 percent
of the value of the home.19 Yet it is not clear that the MIP is excessive, or
that it is driving down demand for HECMs.
In an analysis of reverse mortgage costs, Davidoff (2012) found that the
ability of a borrower to walk away from negative equity (the ‘put option’
embedded in the HECM) was worth more than the cost of the mortgage
insurance, if borrowers used the product to the maximum. It could be
that borrowers do not value the embedded put option, as they typically
do not extract all remaining equity and default on the loan when house
prices fall (Davidoff and Wetzel 2014). If this were the case, then one would
expect demand to rise if the MIP were reduced or eliminated. Yet from 2010
through 2013, there was little demand for a ‘Saver’ version of the HECM
product with a negligible up-front MIP. This does not imply that high upfront costs might not be part of the equation for low demand, but it certainly
does not seem to be the driving factor. In a survey of older homeowners who
considered but did not originate a reverse mortgage, 26 percent indicated
high costs being a factor behind their decision: the same proportion that
indicated a desire to leave their home as a bequest as a reason for not taking
a reverse mortgage (Moulton et al. 2017).
Another possibility is that the interest rate charged to borrowers is too
high, with the spread between the cost of credit to the lender ranging
between one and three percent (Lucas 2015). But as noted in the previous
section, interest rates on reverse mortgages, including the ongoing MIP,
were quite similar to those on other more commonly used traditional mortgage products, including HELOCs, cash-out or straight refinancings, and
purchase mortgages. Also, borrowers in traditional mortgages paid closing
costs that ranged from zero (HELOC) to two percent (cash-out refinancing) of total proceeds. Reverse mortgage origination costs are much higher,
especially because they include an up-front MIP charged by the FHA equal
to two percent of the MCA (home value) plus an origination fee that is
capped at $2,500 to $6,000, depending on home value.
To do an apples-to-apples comparison of the impact of higher up-front
charges on the total cost of the mortgage, we added the up-front cost to the
mortgage balance and then computed the increase in the imputed interest rate required to pay those costs over the life of the loan (assumed to be
12 years). A similar calculation is often presented to borrowers at closing,
called the TALC (total annual loan cost). While HMDA does not report
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the actual value of the closing costs and the origination fee charged, we
ran two scenarios, one with a higher rate (4.75%) plus maximum charges
for the origination fee, and a second scenario with a lower rate (3.0%)
and no origination fee. In both cases, the mortgage borrower would also
pay a 0.5 percent annual MIP. In the case of the high-rate loan, the cost
increased from 5.3 to 6.6 percent, an increase of 1.3 percentage points. For
the low-cost loan, the rate increased from about 3.5 to 4.1 percent, about
0.6 percentage points per year.
By comparison, in the UK, where in 2019 equity release mortgages represented about 36 percent of total mortgage originations for borrowers age
55+, the quoted mortgage rate was 5.21 percent versus a rate of 2.66 percent on a 75 percent LTV 10-year fixed rate mortgage, an annual spread of
almost 2.6 percent (before considering any difference in origination costs
for an equity release mortgage). From 2017 to 2019, that spread was nearly
constant, even as the equity release market grew 32 percent. So higher costs
of equity release, at least in the UK, were not an appreciable impairment to
much faster growth than in the US.
Aside from the costs of reverse mortgages, other barriers to demand
include lack of accurate information about how reverse mortgages work,
combined with generally negative product perceptions. In a survey of a random sample of older adults in the US population, Davidoff et al. (2017)
found older adults were generally aware of reverse mortgages but had inaccurate information about how they worked. For example, only 56 percent
answered correctly that the borrower can stay in the home if the loan
balance exceeds the value of the home. Their results also indicated a significant and positive relationship between having accurate knowledge of the
product and the stated intention to use a reverse mortgage in the future.
According to a Fannie Mae National Housing Survey (2016), 49 percent of homeowners age 55+ were familiar with reverse mortgages, and
only six percent of homeowners indicated preferring reverse mortgages to
extract equity. Twenty percent of the homeowners who were familiar with
reverse mortgages reported that the risk of being scammed was their biggest
concern about reverse mortgages.
Further, lending to an aging population where death is often the way
that the mortgage resolves, creates the potential for headline risk, exacerbating negative public perceptions and discouraging larger institutional
actors from participating in the market. A 2018 industry survey of lending
institutions indicated that reputational risk was the leading reason that certain banks did not originate reverse mortgages (Cameron 2018). Headline
risks can be lowered by reducing the threat of evicting a borrower while
alive, such as for failure to pay property taxes (preventative servicing),
maintaining good communication with heirs, etc.
Of course, there is also one other appreciable common factor in the UK
growth after 2012 and in the US up to 2011: the impact of large brand
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name financial institutions selling reverse mortgages. In the US, during the
growth and in peak years, banks such as Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and
BNY Mellon, as well as the insurance company MetLife, were in the reverse
mortgage business. In the UK, large, brand name insurers and asset managers such as Aviva, Legal and General, and Canada Life, sell equity release
products. In addition, in the UK, financial planners may also sell (and earn
commissions from) reverse mortgages as long as they have an appropriate
license, which American financial planners almost never obtain. In the US,
the exit from the market of brand name financial services firms was followed
by an appreciable decline in originations of the HECM product.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined the usage of reverse mortgages among mortgage
borrowers age 62+, as well as looking at reasons for applicants, of the same
age, being rejected for new mortgage credit. We find that 17 to 27 percent
of actual and rejected borrowers would likely have qualified for an HECM,
depending on the interest rate and closing costs. This group of 301,000 to
460,000 borrowers is nine to 14 times the size of the actual HECM market.
These potential borrowers chose another product (or were rejected from
their preferred product) despite having very high DTI ratios of 36 to more
than 50 percent in the case of half or more of the sample. Among seniors
with an existing mortgage, at least five million could have used a reverse
mortgage to eliminate mortgage payments.
The existence of a large number of seniors with an existing mortgage or
taking out new mortgages with quite high LTVs (an average of 55 to 78%
combined LTV, depending on the product) suggests that many seniors do,
in fact, utilize home equity in order to fund their retirement. However, they
choose products that require monthly payments that last decades into retirement and rise as a share of (falling) income as they get older. Of course, the
puzzle remains for home equity as for other savings, as to why seniors enter
retirement with fewer assets than the life cycle model would predict and
spend less in retirement than the model implies would be optimal.
We consider a number of possible explanations for why American seniors
do not use reverse mortgages to spend home equity and instead rely
on loans with high required monthly payments, reasons which include
precautionary savings for health shocks, bequest motives, high costs of
reverse mortgages, and the lack of brand name institutions in the reverse
mortgage business. We show that equity release products have exhibited
enormous growth in the last decade in Canada and the UK, the latter of
which has an active market that includes large insurance companies. In the
US, the reverse mortgage market hit its peak at a time when brand name
financial institutions sold the product to the public. Thus, it appears that
institutional barriers that discourage entry by brand name companies may
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be an important factor limiting the distribution of reverse mortgages in
the US.
Of course, this then raises the question as to why these companies do not
enter the reverse mortgage business. One possibility is the negative reputation of reverse mortgages, which may discourage companies sensitive to
their brands. Policies by the US government in the HECM program that
require foreclosures as a way to resolve the failure to pay T&I suggest the
potential for appreciable headline risk. By comparison, in the UK, foreclosures to resolve T&I defaults are nearly non-existent. In the US, regulation
also restricts financial planners or insurers from selling reverse mortgages
without obtaining a mortgage origination license. Such licensing is time
consuming, expensive, and has potential legal risks associated with crossselling different products. In the future, the continued rise of fee-based
planners who are paid for advice rather than product sales could spur planners to consider home equity as part of the planning process. Finally, the
adoption of a fiduciary or ‘best interest’ standard might also move planners
to consider housing in the planning process.
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Endnotes
1. See, for example, Goodman et al. (2017); Lusardi et al. (2017, 2020); Mayer
(2017); and Brown et al. (2020).
2. Authors’ calculations using the 1992–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances in 2016
dollars (Goodman et al. 2017).
3. See Goodman et al. (2017) and Haurin et al. (2019).
4. In one survey (EBRI 2019), eight in 10 workers reported that they expected to work in retirement, but only 28 percent of retirees actually work for
pay.
5. While we do not have formal data, equity release issuance in Australia has
declined in recent years as some larger banks exited the market. Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have small markets with fewer than five lenders.
Norway has between five and 10 lenders (EY 2020).
6. We report some data on private-label reverse mortgages in the empirical work
that follows for 2018.
7. The MCA is subject to a cap, which was $679,650 in 2018, but lower in previous
years.
8. Data on the UK from Equity Release Council, 2018 and 2019 market reports.
9. Approximately 600,000 HECMs are outstanding today out of a pool of approximately 26 million elderly homeowners age 65+. Factoring in those age 62–64
probably lowers the number by about 10 percent.
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10. These new reporting requirements were added by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau through a 2015 HMDA rule that amended Regulation C (HMDA’s
implementing legislation). The new reporting requirements first went into effect
with the 2018 HMDA data release. Not all lenders are required to report under
HMDA, with exemptions for smaller institutions and those originating a small
number of loans in the prior two years (CFPB 2019).
11. A small number of proprietary reverse mortgages are offered to borrowers age
60+, but these private-label products were quite rare in 2018 and available in only
a handful of states.
12. An estimated eight percent of all homes in 2019 according authors calculations
using data from Zillow.
13. While the FHA data indicate that 41,690 HECM loans were endorsed by HUD
in 2018, the number originated in 2018 is smaller (endorsements typically occur
one to two months after closing). Based on a one-month lag between loan closing
and endorsement, we estimate that about 37,000 HECM loans closed during the
2018 calendar year. The 2018 HMDA data thus represents about 85 percent of
HECM loans closed.
14. To correct for HMDA reporting errors, we merged in the PLF from HUD data
using the borrower’s age and interest rate in HMDA. If the lender reported loan
amount (property value or loan limit) was 0.1 percentage points smaller or larger
than the PLF, we replaced the lender reported loan amount with an estimated
IPL using the HUD PLF. This resulted in the replacement of about 26 percent
of reported HECM loan amounts in the 2018 HMDA data. Most of the replaced
loan amounts were much smaller than the IPL, and likely reflected misreporting
of the loan amount as the initial draw amount rather than the IPL.
15. This is called a Life Expectancy Set Aside (LESA) and is used by between five and
10 percent of HECM borrowers.
16. HUD sets the maximum lender origination fee to be two percent of the first
$200,000 of property value or $2,500 (whichever is greater), plus one percent
of additional property value above $200,000, with a maximum of $6,000.
17. Closing costs vary widely by state and mortgage amount and can be higher in
states with a mortgage recording tax, for example, in Florida.
18. The characteristics are quite similar for those who would have qualified at the 3
and 4.75 percent rate groups, so we presented the former group to economize
on tables. Results are available for the 4.75 percent group upon request.
19. The lender origination fee of $2,500 to $6,000 is another potential up-front cost.
However, this is negotiable, and can be reduced or eliminated depending on the
market and the circumstances of the borrower.

References
Ameriks, J., A. Caplin, S. Laufer, and S. Van Nieuwerburgh. (2011). ‘The Joy of Giving or Assisted Living? Using Strategic Surveys to Separate Public Care Aversion
from Bequest Motives,’ Journal of Finance, 66: 519–561.
Begley, J. and S. Chan (2019). ‘Understanding Older Adult Mobility Decisions: The
Role of Children,’ Working Paper. New York, NY: NYU Furman Center for Real
Estate and Urban Policy.

The Market for Reverse Mortgages among Older Americans

297

Binette, J. and K. Vasold (2018). Home and Community Preferences: A National Survey of Adults Age 18-Plus. Washington, DC: AARP. August: https://doi.org/
10.26419/res.00231.001
Borella, M., M. De Nardi, and E. French (2018). ‘Who Receives Medicaid in Old
Age? Rules and Reality,’ Fiscal Studies, 39(1): 65–93.
Brown, M., D. Lee, J. Scally, and W. van der Klaauw (2020). ‘The Graying of American
Debt,’ in O. S. Mitchell and A. Lusardi, eds., Remaking Retirement: Debt in an Aging
Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 35–59.
Cameron, J. (2018). ‘Moving Forward in Reverse,’ Stratmor Group Insight Report,
February. https://www.stratmorgroup.com/insights_article/moving-forward-inreverse/
CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) (2019). ‘Introducing New and
Revised Data Points in HMDA,’ OIG, Washington, DC, August 30.
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/
introducing-new-revised-data-points-hmda/
Cocco, J. F. and P. Lopes (2019). ‘Aging in Place, Housing Maintenance, and Reverse
Mortgages,’ The Review of Economic Studies, 87(4): 1799–1836. https://doi.org/10.
1093/restud/rdz047
Costa-Font, J., R. G. Frank, and K. Swartz (2018). ‘Access to Long Term Care after
a Wealth Shock: Evidence from the Housing Bubble and Burst,’ NBER Working
Paper No. 23781. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dalton, M. and D. LaFave (2017). ‘Mitigating the Consequences of a Health
Condition: The Role of Intra-and Interhousehold Assistance,’ Journal of Health
Economics, 53: 38–52.
Davidoff, T. (2010). ‘Home Equity Commitment and Long-term Care Insurance
Demand,’ Journal of Public Economics, 94(1): 44–49.
Davidoff, T. (2012). ‘Can ‘High Costs’ Justify Weak Demand for the Home
Equity Conversion Mortgage?’ The Review of Financial Studies, 28(8):
2364-98.
Davidoff, T., P. Gerhard, and T. Post (2017). ‘Reverse Mortgages: What Homeowners
(Don’t) Know and How it Matters,’ Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
133: 151–171.
Davidoff, T. and J. Wetzel (2014). ‘Do Reverse Mortgage Borrowers Use Credit Ruthlessly?’ University of British Columbia Working Paper (July 22). https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2279930
De Nardi, M., E. French, and J. B. Jones (2010). ‘Why Do the Elderly Save? The Role
of Medical Expenses,’ Journal of Political Economy, 118: 38–75.
De Nardi, M., E. French, and J.B. Jones (2016). ‘Savings after Retirement: A Survey,’
Annual Review of Economics, 8: 177–204.
De Nardi, M., E. French, J.B. Jones, and J. McCauley. (2016). ‘Medical Spending of
the US Elderly,’ Fiscal Studies, 37(3–4): 717–747.
EBRI (Employee Benefit Research Institute) (2019). 2019 Retirement Confidence
Survey Summary Report. Washington, DC: EBRI.
Englehardt, G. and M. Eriksen (2019). ‘Homeownership in Old Age and at the End
of Life,’ Presented at the Symposium for Housing Tenure and Financial Security, Fannie Mae and the Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA, March.

298

New Models for Managing Longevity Risk

EY (Ernst & Young Global Limited) (2020). 2020 Global Equity Release Roundtable
Survey. London: Ernst & Young Global Limited.
Fannie Mae (2016). ‘Older Homeowners: Accessing Home Equity in Retirement,’
National Housing Survey, Topic Analysis, Q2. http://www.fanniemae.com
/resources/file/research/housingsurvey/pdf/Q2-2016-accessing-home-equityin-retirement.pdf
Favreault, M. and J. Dey (2015). ‘Long-Term Services and Supports for Older Americans: Risks and Financing Research Brief, Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation, US Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC. https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/ong-term-services-and-supportsolder-americans-risksand-financing-research-brief
Fisher, J. D. (2019). ‘Who Files for Personal Bankruptcy in the United States?’ The
Journal of Consumer Affairs, 53(4): 2003-26.
Fronstin, P. and J. Van Derhei (2017). ‘Savings Medicare Beneficiaries Need for
Health Expenses: Some Couples Could Need as Much as $350,000,’ EBRI Notes,
38: 1
Gilligan, A. M., D. S. Alberts, D. J. Roe, and G. H. Skrepnek (2018). ‘Death or
Debt? National Estimates of Financial Toxicity in Persons with Newly-diagnosed
Cancer,’ The American Journal of Medicine, 131(10): 1187–1195.
Goodman, L., K. Kaul, and J. Zhu (2017). ‘What the 2016 Survey of Consumer
Finances Tells Us about Senior Homeowners,’ Urban Institute Research Report,
November.
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/94526/
what-the-2016-survey-of-consumer-finances-tells-us-about-senior-homeowners.
pdf
Goodman, L. and C. Mayer (2018). ‘Homeownership and the American Dream,’
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 32(1) Winter: 31–58.
Gupta, A., E. R. Morrison, C. R. Fedorenko, and S. D. Ramsey (2018). ‘Home Equity
Mitigates the Financial and Mortality Consequences of Health Shocks: Evidence
from Cancer Diagnosis.’ Working Paper: New York University, Stern School of
Business.
Haurin, D., C. Loibl, and S. Moulton (2019). ‘Debt Stress and Mortgage Borrowing in Older Age: Implications for Economic Security in Retirement,’ Working
Paper prepared for the Retirement Disability Research Consortium. Madison:
University of Wisconsin.
Haurin, D. R. and S. Moulton (2017). ‘International Perspectives on Homeownership and Home Equity Extraction by Senior Households,’ Ohio State University
Working Paper, June 5: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985917
Hurd, M., P.-C. Michaud, and S. Rohwedder (2013). ‘The Lifetime Risk of Nursing Home Use.’ National Bureau of Economic Research. Microsoft Word - Lifetime
NH_Hurd_Michaud_Rohwedder.docx (nber.org)
Li, W. and M. White (2020). ‘Financial Distress among the Elderly: Bankruptcy
Reform and the Financial Crisis.’ In O. S. Mitchell and A. Lusardi, eds, Remaking
Retirement: Debt in an Aging Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 89–105.
Lockwood, L. M. (2018). ‘Incidental Bequests and the Choice to Self-insure Late-life
Risks,’ American Economic Review, 108(9): 2513–2550.
Lucas, D. (2015). ‘Hacking Reverse Mortgages,’ MIT Center for Financial Policy
Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. http://
gcfp.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ReverseMortgagesV10.pdf

The Market for Reverse Mortgages among Older Americans

299

Lusardi, A., O. S. Mitchell, and N. Oggero (2017). ‘Debt and Financial Vulnerability
on the Verge of Retirement,’ NBER Working Paper No. w23664. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lusardi, A., O.S. Mitchell, and N. Oggero (2020). ‘Debt Close to Retirement and its
Implications for Retirement Wellbeing,’ in O. S. Mitchell and A. Lusardi, eds.,
Remaking Retirement: Debt in an Aging Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 15–34.
Mayer, C. (2017). ‘Housing, Mortgages, and Retirement,’ in L. Fennell and B. Keys,
eds., Evidence and Innovation in Housing Law and Policy. New York: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 203-30.
Modigliani, F. and R. H. Brumberg (1954). ‘Utility Analysis and the Consumption
Function: An Interpretation of Cross-section Data,’ Iin K. Kurihara, ed., PostKeynesian Economics. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, pp. 388–436.
Moulton, S., S. Dodini, D. R. Haurin, and M. D. Schmeiser (2019). ‘Seniors’
Home Equity Extraction: Credit Constraints and Borrowing Channels,’ Ohio
State University Working Paper, June 25. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2727204
Moulton, S. and D. Haurin (2019). ‘Unlocking Housing Wealth for Older Americans: Strategies to Improve Reverse Mortgages,’ Brookings Economic Studies Working Paper, October. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads
/2019/10/ES_20191016_MoultonHaurin_ReverseMortgages.pdf
Moulton, S., C. Loibl, and Haurin, D. (2017). ‘Reverse Mortgage Motivations and
Outcomes: Insights from Survey Data.’ CityScape, 19(1), 73-98.
Nakajima, M. and I. A. Telyukova (2017). ‘Reverse Mortgage Loans: A Quantitative
Analysis,’ The Journal of Finance, 72(2): 911–950.
Nakajima, M. and I. A. Telyukova (2020) ‘Home Equity in Retirement,’ International
Economic Review, 61(2): 573-616.
NRMLA (National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association) (2020). ‘Senior
Housing Wealth Reaches Record $7.23 Trillion,’ April 3. https://www.
nrmlaonline.org/about/press-releases/senior-housing-wealth-reaches-record-723-trillion
Poterba, J. and S. Venti (2017). ‘Financial Well-being in Late Life: Understanding the Impact of Adverse Health Shocks and Spousal Deaths,’ Prepared
for the 19th Annual Joint Meeting of the Retirement Research Consortium,
August 3–4. Washington, DC. http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/
4a.-James-Poterba.pdf
Poterba, J., S. Venti, and D. Wise (2011). ‘The Composition and Drawdown of Wealth
in Retirement,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(4) Fall: 95–118.
Poterba, J., S. Venti, and D. Wise (2017). ‘What Determines End-of-life Assets: A
Retrospective View,’ in D. Wise, ed., Insights in the Economics of Aging. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, pp. 127–157.
Poterba, J., S. Venti, and D. Wise (2018). ‘Longitudinal Determinants of End-of-life
Wealth Inequality,’ Journal of Public Economics, 162: 78–88.
Rexrode, C. (2020). ‘Over 60 with Decades Left on the Mortgage: The New Retirement Math,’ Wall Street Journal, April 11. https://www.wsj.com/articles/over-60
-with-decades-left-on-the-mortgage-the-new-retirement-math–11586556588

300

New Models for Managing Longevity Risk

Ricks, J. S. (2018). ‘Homeowner Behavior, Health Status, and Medicaid Payment Eligibility: Evidence from the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.’ Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management, 37(4) 732–54.
Venti, S. and D. Wise (1990). ‘But They Don’t Want to Reduce Housing Equity,’ in
D. Wise, ed., Issues in the Economics of Aging. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, pp. 13–29.
Venti, S. and D. Wise (2004). ‘Aging and Housing Equity: Another Look,’ in D. Wise,
ed., Perspectives on the Economics of Aging. Chicago. IL: University of Chicago Press,
pp. 127–181.

